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16 August 2022

Amazon.com

8Frameworks
16Insights

Frameworks in this episode

Insights & moments

The myth-busts, hot takes, explainers, and tools worth keeping.

Hot Take· 1

Hot Take3:49:30

$7 a foot versus 30 cents: the cost argument analysts missed

Early analysts dismissed Amazon as a razor-thin retailer with no structural cost advantage. Bezos's counter, from an early interview, was that a giant cost in retailing is rent — roughly $7 a square foot for prime retail space at the time, against about 30 cents for warehouse space. Stores are forced to hold most of their inventory in the most expensive real estate there is; Amazon holds none of it there. The hosts note that even Walmart pays more per foot than Amazon's fulfilment centres.

  • Analysts framed Amazon as lipstick on a pig — a retailer with a website
  • Prime retail space cited at around $7 per square foot at the time
  • Warehouse space at roughly 30 cents per square foot
  • Stores must store inventory in their most expensive real estate
  • Even Walmart's stores cost more per foot than Amazon's fulfilment centres
  • The hosts concede many other bear arguments were reasonable — this one was not

“a gigantic cost in the retailing business is your rent”

3:49:30

“stores have to store all of their inventory or a lot of their inventory in very expensive real estate Amazon totally does not”

3:50:00
#cost structure#real estate#retail economics#bear case

Explainer· 3

Explainer1:05:00

Why Amazon is in Seattle: a 1992 Supreme Court sales tax ruling

Bezos originally intended to build Amazon in Santa Cruz. A 1992 Supreme Court decision held that retailers need not collect sales tax in states where they have no physical presence, shifting the burden to the customer. That ruled out California, New York, Texas and Florida. The remaining criteria were proximity to a book distributor, access to technical talent and a small enough population to limit the taxed market — a Venn diagram that pointed to Seattle, near Ingram's Oregon warehouse and Microsoft at its peak.

  • 1992 Supreme Court ruling removed the collection burden from out-of-state retailers
  • Bezos treated no sales tax as a 5-10% price advantage, not a tax dodge
  • Seattle was close to Ingram in Roseburg, Oregon — a half-day drive
  • Microsoft supplied the technical talent pool
  • Washington's small population limited the share of market lost to in-state tax
  • Bezos had zero prior connection to Seattle

“in 1992 the Supreme Court had ruled on a decision that retail companies do not have to collect sales tax in states where they don't…”

1:05:00

“close to a book distributor has access to technical Talent not too populous but enough technical people I can hire”

1:06:00
#location strategy#sales tax#seattle#operations
Explainer1:12:00

Obidos, cookies and the Sybase call that was never returned

Shel Kaphan, Amazon's first engineer, chose Oracle over Sybase for one reason: Sybase never returned his call. Amazon went on to become Oracle's largest instance by traffic. With no cookies or sessions yet in browsers, Kaphan built a rendering engine called Obidos that passed IDs through the URL so the server could dynamically generate pages with a shopping cart and recommendations. At Amazon, front-end meant customer-facing and back-end meant warehouse-facing, and nearly everything was written in C.

  • Sybase lost the database bake-off by not returning the call
  • Amazon became Oracle's largest instance by read and write traffic
  • Obidos passed IDs through the URL to work around the absence of cookies
  • It enabled carts and 'people who bought this also bought' recommendations
  • Front-end meant consumer-facing; back-end meant warehouse-facing
  • Kaphan ignored Bezos's instruction to also build an email-based storefront

“the choices were cbase and Oracle and cbase did not return Shell's call and so he chose Oracle”

1:12:30

“he invented this really insane engine it's basically a rendering engine called obidos”

1:15:30
#early engineering#obidos#oracle#web architecture
Explainer2:53:00

Treat Google like a mountain: A9, search defence and a $30bn ad business

Bezos told Amazon staff to treat Google like a mountain — climb it, but do not move it, and do not make it smarter about your catalogue. Amazon set up A9, a Palo Alto subsidiary, first attempting a general search engine, which failed against Google's data network effect. The winning insight was that Amazon owns the one search corpus Google cannot see: demand and intent data from searches on Amazon itself, plus reviews and conversion. That defence became an advertising business at roughly a $30bn run rate.

  • 'Use them but don't make them smarter' was the internal instruction
  • A9 stands for algorithms — A plus nine letters
  • A general search engine failed against Google's data network effect
  • Amazon uniquely holds on-site query, intent and conversion data
  • Shel Kaphan wrote the original review system over a weekend in 1996
  • Search ads on Amazon are near-100% margin with no customer acquisition cost
  • The A9 work also drove the move from a monolith to microservices

“treat Google like a mountain you can climb the mountain but you can't move it use them but don't make them smarter”

2:53:30

“any web platform of sufficient scale can layer on for free a second business of advertising”

2:59:00
#search#advertising#google#data network effects

Story· 10

Story22:00

The West Texas ranch summers that built Jeff Bezos

Bezos's maternal grandfather, Lawrence Preston Gise, ran the US nuclear weapons programme at Sandia National Laboratories and had been an early member of DARPA. After retiring he moved to a 24,000-acre ranch in West Texas, 100 miles from the nearest store, where Bezos spent every summer from the age of four. The hosts argue this combination of forced self-sufficiency and constant exposure to a hyper-intelligent engineer is the single most formative experience in his life.

  • Both of Bezos's biological grandfathers worked at Sandia National Laboratories
  • Grandfather 'Pop' Gise ran Sandia and was an early DARPA member
  • 24,000-acre ranch, 100 miles from the nearest retail outlet
  • They built their own tools, did their own veterinary work and rebuilt farm equipment
  • Explains the cowboy-boots-and-rockets image that reads as affectation from the outside

“Jeff spends every summer on the ranch living with his grandparents 100 miles from the nearest store”

22:00

“they perform their own Veterinary work there's a story about performing surgery on one of the bird dog's tails”

23:00
#founder origins#self-sufficiency#bezos#formative experiences
Story40:30

How the everything store was invented inside a hedge fund

At D. E. Shaw, Bezos and David Shaw met weekly to brainstorm internet businesses, with Bezos spending the rest of the week researching feasibility. They launched an E*TRADE competitor and Juno, the free email service, out of the firm. The idea they got most excited about was called the everything store — an internet intermediary layer between consumers and manufacturers, with factories drop-shipping directly to customers. The hosts note the original plan was fundamentally flawed and that drop-shipping was never going to work.

  • Bezos was the fourth senior vice president at D. E. Shaw in his mid-to-late twenties
  • Weekly ideation meetings with David Shaw, then a week of solo research
  • Prior internet businesses launched from the firm: an online brokerage and Juno
  • Original everything store plan relied on manufacturers drop-shipping to customers
  • Bezos left, raised $1m across 60 meetings from 22 investors for 20% of the company

“the two of them would meet every week they would brainstorm ideas”

39:00

“the idea was that you could use the internet to build a whole new intermediary layer between consumer and manufacturers that would bypass traditional retail”

41:00
#d e shaw#startup origins#business plans#internet 1994
Story1:20:00

Yahoo's homepage offer and the first four weeks of Amazon

Amazon launched publicly on 16 July 1995 and did $25,000 of revenue in the first two weeks purely by word of mouth. Then David Filo and Jerry Yang emailed asking to feature the site on Yahoo's homepage. Shel Kaphan argued they could not handle the traffic; Bezos said yes anyway. Within two weeks Amazon had sold to all 50 states and 45 countries and was doing $20,000 a week. They spent zero marketing dollars in their first year.

  • First purchase, 3 April 1995, was a Douglas Hofstadter book bought by a friend of Kaphan
  • $25,000 of revenue in the first two weeks, all word of mouth
  • Yahoo had only incorporated in March 1995 and raised from Sequoia
  • Kaphan warned they were not ready; Bezos went ahead anyway
  • All 50 states and 45 countries within four weeks of launch
  • Half a million dollars of revenue in the first six months on $200k of friends-and-family funding

“they launch it in the first two weeks they do $25,000 in Revenue it's just people telling their friends”

1:20:00

“Shell's like guys I don't think we're ready for this I don't think we can handle what's about to happen here”

1:21:30
#launch#distribution#yahoo#product market fit
Story1:57:00

Book Predator: how Barnes & Noble tried to kill Amazon at its IPO

When Amazon filed to go public, the Riggio brothers flew to Seattle for a dinner that was simultaneously an acquisition offer and a threat. They went home and did two things: launched an internal project code-named Book Predator to build barnesandnoble.com, and sued Amazon over its 'Earth's largest bookstore' claim, announcing the suit three days before the IPO priced. Forrester published a note titled 'Amazon.toast'. Amazon priced at $17 and traded down on day one.

  • The dinner was both a buy offer and a threat to crush Amazon
  • Bezos brought Tom Alberg, a former high-profile corporate lawyer, to the dinner
  • Internal project code name: Book Predator
  • Lawsuit announced three days before the IPO priced
  • Forrester's note was titled 'Amazon.toast'
  • Q2 1997 revenue of $28m — more than all of 1996 — reversed Wall Street's view

“they launch a new project new you know initiative within the company with the code name book predator”

1:57:00

“the rigos were reluctant to lose money on a relatively small part of their business”

2:03:30
#competition#ipo#barnes and noble#incumbents
Story2:00:00

The year-long hunt for Walmart's number two in IT

Bezos and Joy Covey made repeated recruiting trips to Bentonville and zeroed in on Rick Dalzell, the hands-on lieutenant behind Walmart's private satellite network and computerised logistics. He committed, then backed out after Walmart CEO Lee Scott told him he could be a future CEO and that Amazon would hit a brick wall at scale. They eventually got him, he was escorted out by security, and he airlifted about a dozen Walmart executives after him. Walmart sued for trade secrets and settled with no damages.

  • Roughly a year-long recruitment, including one reversal
  • Lee Scott warned Dalzell it would be career suicide
  • Being escorted out by security backfired — it made Walmart insiders curious
  • Dalzell brought about a dozen Walmart executives with him
  • Walmart sued Amazon in late 1998; the case settled with no damages
  • Jeff Wilke later renamed distribution centres as fulfilment centres

“Rick you've got a future here you could be a future CEO of Walmart you're making a big mistake”

2:02:30

“he also airlifts about a dozen Executives out of Walmart to come join him”

2:04:00
#recruiting#logistics#walmart#talent
Story2:13:00

"Warehouses are not cool": the meeting that decided Amazon vs eBay

In summer 1998 Meg Whitman and Pierre Omidyar flew to Seattle. The two Jeffs toured them through a fulfilment centre and floated a $600m acquisition. Omidyar came away impressed by the differentiation; Whitman's view, as relayed by Brad Stone, was that warehouses are not cool and high-margin internet businesses are. The hosts argue both were right on different time frames — eBay's asset-light model was better for a decade, Bezos was optimising for a decade after that.

  • eBay was still a startup; Amazon was already public
  • A $600m acquisition number was floated obliquely
  • Omidyar was impressed by the fulfilment centre; Whitman was not
  • eBay hit a $25bn market cap by 1999, four years after founding as AuctionWeb
  • Amazon's stock tripled in 2007 while eBay's fell over 50%
  • Bezos: long term there is never any misalignment between customer and shareholder interest

“you know what is cool high margin internet businesses that's cool you don't want to be mucking around with warehouses”

2:14:30

“99 times out of 100 i' want to invest in eBay but Amazon dominated eBay”

2:10:00
#ebay#business models#asset light#long term thinking
Story2:24:00

How a failed acquisition made Bezos a billionaire via Google

Amazon acquired comparison-shopping company Junglee and forced the Palo Alto team to move to Seattle to avoid a California tax nexus. They hated it and quit within months. One of them, Ram Shriram, went back to Palo Alto, put the first $250,000 into Google and joined its board. Bezos heard about it, insisted on investing at the same seed price six months later, and he and MacKenzie put in $250,000 of personal money — likely over 1% of Google.

  • Junglee was bought for somewhere around $50-175m and the integration failed immediately
  • The team was relocated to Seattle purely to avoid a California tax nexus
  • Shriram invested the first $250,000 in Google and joined the board
  • Bezos insisted on the same seed terms six months after the round closed
  • Google's Series A was at a $100m post-money, split by Doerr and Moritz
  • Google IPO'd at $23bn in 2004 and has risen roughly 65x since

“he convinces Larry and Sergey to take another $250,000 of Jeff and McKenzie's personal money at the seed price”

2:26:00

“that's how Jeff and McKenzie got wealthy”

2:27:30
#google#angel investing#acquisitions#relationships
Story2:32:00

The COO the Amazon executives rejected like a bad organ transplant

With the stock falling in 1999, the board brought in Bill Campbell and asked Bezos to hire a COO. They settled on Joe Galli from Black & Decker, who arrived believing the role was a stepping stone to CEO. Bezos reorganised so Galli was his only direct report, but Galli commuted to the east coast every weekend and had his secretary print and read his email aloud. The executive team rejected him outright. His lasting contribution was helping recruit Jeff Wilke.

  • Jamie Dimon was reportedly a leading candidate for the COO job
  • Bill Campbell's pattern was persuading founders to accept adult supervision
  • Galli had signed to run a Pepsi division before joining — echoes of John Sculley
  • Bezos made Galli his only direct report but refused the CEO succession framing
  • Galli's secretary printed and read his email to him
  • He helped recruit Jeff Wilke, later CEO of Amazon retail

“the board asks Jeff to bring in a COO to compliment him”

2:32:00

“the Amazon Executives just reject this like a bad organ transplant”

2:35:00
#leadership#culture#coo#founder control
Story2:44:30

Letting competitors inside the castle: the birth of Amazon Marketplace

In autumn 2000, with Amazon under real pressure, Meg Whitman and Jeff Jordan flew up and offered to run Amazon's third-party selling on eBay technology. Bezos took it personally, called an emergency weekend leadership meeting at his house, and emerged with Marketplace — third-party listings on Amazon's own product pages, competing for the buy button against Amazon's own category managers. It launched in November, mid-Q4, in a company where you were not allowed to push code before Christmas.

  • The eBay proposal was the trigger; Bezos treated it as a personal challenge
  • Amazon's authoritative product catalogue and ASINs made it possible
  • Third-party listings won the buy button when cheaper and verifiably identical
  • Category managers' numbers were undercut by a different internal team
  • Launched mid-Q4, breaking Amazon's own code freeze rule
  • Reached about 15% of orders quickly; over 50% today

“we call it Amazon Marketplace and so they launched this in a matter of months”

2:46:30

“you just let all your competition inside your walls in the castle on your product page”

2:47:00
#marketplace#third party sellers#org design#founder leadership
Story3:02:30

The Kindle was inspired by the two men who went on to found Tesla

Martin Eberhard and Marc Tarpenning watched Napster digitise music and reasoned books were next, but that there was no MP3 player for a book. They built the Rocket eBook at NuvoMedia and pitched Bezos, who wanted exclusivity. They went to Barnes & Noble instead, who invested without demanding it. Gemstar bought the company for nearly $200m, and that money funded Tesla Motors in 2003. When iTunes for Windows launched, Bezos called Eberhard back, was pointed at E Ink at the MIT Media Lab, and set up Lab126.

  • The insight: books are easily digitised but there is no MP3 player for a book
  • Bezos demanded exclusivity; Barnes & Noble did not, and won the deal
  • Gemstar TV Guide acquired NuvoMedia for nearly $200m, funding Tesla
  • iTunes for Windows in late 2003 created the urgency at Amazon
  • LCD failed for reading in bed, in the sun and on battery — hence E Ink
  • Lab126 took two years plus a slipped release; Kindle shipped in 2007 at $9.99 a book
  • Bezos insisted on a BlackBerry-style scroll wheel over the design firm's objections

“there's no equivalent of an MP3 player for a book you don't want to read a book on your computer you want to read a…”

3:04:30

“Martin everhard and Mark tarpening inspired Jeff pesos and Amazon to build the kid”

3:03:30
#kindle#hardware#tesla#disruption

Takeaway· 2

Takeaway4:05:30

When Amazon is customer-focused and when it is competitor-focused

Despite the customer-obsession rhetoric, Bezos sits in a lineage of retailers — Sol Price, Sam Walton, Jim Sinegal — who shamelessly shop their competitors. Sam Walton's rule was to come back and report what rivals do right, not what they do wrong. Brad Stone's framing, per the hosts, is that Amazon can afford to be purely customer-focused in emerging markets where it leads, and becomes sharply competitor-focused in crowded markets where it is behind, as with online grocery.

  • Sol Price, Sam Walton, Jim Sinegal and Bezos share a competitor-shopping lineage
  • Sam Walton: report what they do right, not what they do wrong
  • Customer-focus is a luxury available to market leaders in emerging categories
  • Competitor-focus is forced when you are behind in a crowded market
  • Amazon Fresh and grocery are the example of falling behind and having to react
  • Sinegal openly shared the Costco model with a future competitor because that is how retail works

“go shop our competitors come back don't tell me what they're doing wrong tell me what they're doing right”

4:06:00

“if it's in a Emerging Market they're customer focus cuz they can afford to be especially when they're the market leader”

4:06:30
#competition#customer obsession#retail lineage#strategy
Takeaway4:08:30

The moats were dug in the nuclear winter, 2000 to 2007

Amazon was arguably hit harder by the dot-com crash than any other surviving internet stock, having taken in roughly $2bn of convertible debt during the boom. The hosts' closing argument is that the decisive work happened afterwards: from 2000 to 2007 Amazon invested and built through the downturn while competitors retrenched, and that is when it distanced itself by miles. The precondition is having managed the company so you still have access to capital when everyone else does not.

  • Amazon raised roughly $2bn in convertible debt — far more than its $54m IPO
  • The convertible raise is what actually saved the company
  • 1,300 layoffs in 2001 and a motto change from 'get big fast' to 'get our house in order'
  • The 2000-2007 build-out produced the fulfilment moat
  • Competitors licked their wounds while Amazon invested through the crash
  • Precondition: retaining access to capital through the downturn

“that was the time to build and Jeff was completely unafraid to do so”

4:09:00

“when the crash came they invested through it they built through it and distanced themselves by Miles from their competitors”

4:09:30
#downturns#capital allocation#moats#timing