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Mitch Lasky25 April 2023

Benchmark’s Mitch Lasky and Blake Robbins on The Art of Business in Gaming

9Frameworks
15Insights

Frameworks in this episode

Insights & moments

The myth-busts, hot takes, explainers, and tools worth keeping.

Myth Buster· 1

Myth Buster14:00

Casual games are not a sideshow - they are most of the industry

The mainstream games business has always treated casual titles as not real games, a view Lasky says persists today. The numbers say otherwise: by 1990 standards, probably more than half of the video game business would now be classified as casual. The hosts push further, arguing gaming is an innately human activity rather than a teenage-boy hobby, and Lasky's own experience selling a mobile bowling game to hotel clerks and strangers is what convinced him.

  • The casual revolution started around 1996 with lame digital versions of Hasbro and Barbie titles
  • Core industry insiders still frame casual as not the real games business
  • More than half of today's industry would count as casual by 1990 definitions
  • Many Candy Crush players do not identify as gamers at all

“gaming is not for teenage boys gaming is a innately human activity that now we see in full bore”

Ben Gilbert · 14:00

“it's most of the video game business right it's probably more than 50 of the video game business”

Mitch Lasky · 15:00
#casual games#mobile#market size#industry myths

Hot Take· 2

Hot Take29:00

Game Pass may signal the end of the platform-publisher road

Lasky reads Microsoft's Game Pass as a harbinger. Platform-based publishers historically aggregated demand in order to collapse the supply side. Game Pass reverses the direction, aggregating supply again through exclusive content and the sixty-nine billion dollar Activision acquisition, in the same way Netflix or Apple buy content to retain subscribers. He treats that reversal as evidence the current road for platform-based publishing may be ending.

  • Demand aggregation was the whole point of the platform-publisher model
  • Game Pass buys supply to hold subscribers, inverting the strategy
  • The Activision acquisition is framed as content buying, not platform building
  • Exclusivity language is legally sensitive given the European Commission review at the time

“where they had historically aggregated users in an attempt to collapse the supply side so aggregate demand to collapse Supply he's now filled with Game…”

Mitch Lasky · 29:30

“it's basically like you know Netflix or apple or or or one of these other companies buying exclusive content”

Mitch Lasky · 29:30
#microsoft#game pass#aggregation#subscriptions
Hot Take35:30

The next 90 days decide Nintendo's next decade

The bull case laid out here is that Nintendo should stop re-aggregating its fan base with every new console and instead iterate the Switch with full backwards compatibility, carrying a hundred-million-plus install base forward. Lasky adds that Nintendo has by far the lowest third-party revenue per active user of any console maker, so an open app store is the unlocked value. A non-backwards-compatible device would signal a return to the hardware-first Iwata era.

  • Nintendo's third-party revenue per active user is a fraction of its console rivals
  • Backwards compatibility preserves the install base instead of restarting it
  • An open app store would make the platform compelling to third-party developers
  • The choice between the two paths would be visible within roughly 90 days of the conversation

“we shouldn't come out with a completely new console and have to re-aggregate our whole fan base again we should iterate the switch and make…”

Host · 35:30

“I think we will learn a lot about what their strategy is going to look like for the next decade in the next like 90…”

Mitch Lasky · 36:00
#nintendo#switch#platform strategy#app store

Explainer· 5

Explainer32:00

Why cloud gaming failed the first time - and why it might not now

Lasky was a pioneering investor in Gaikai and diagnoses the early-2010s failure as a mismatch between the user and the technological opportunity. The games worth streaming were exactly the games whose audience already owned capable hardware, which is why Stadia demoed Assassin's Creed to people who already had a PlayStation or a gaming PC. The market that makes cloud gaming work is the expanded, casually self-identifying audience of the last twelve to fifteen years.

  • Early cloud gaming solved a hardware problem for people who already had the hardware
  • Stadia's GDC line-up demonstrated the mismatch precisely
  • Demand, not technology, was the missing ingredient
  • A generation raised on Fortnite and mobile now wants console-quality games without owning a rig

“it was a mismatch between the user and the technological opportunity”

Mitch Lasky · 32:00

“I do think however that the the audience has expanded really in the in the last 12 to 15 years”

Mitch Lasky · 33:00
#cloud gaming#stadia#gaikai#market timing
Explainer43:00

Why console attach rates do not transfer to free-to-play

A colleague asked why a free-to-play game could not hit FIFA Ultimate Team's attach rates. Lasky's answer is willingness to pay. The Ultimate Team buyer has already spent sixty dollars on the game and five hundred on the console; getting a free-to-play player from zero to one, entering a credit card for the first virtual good, is a completely different act. Ultimate Team is a card-pack business selling literal bits at around ninety-nine percent gross margin.

  • Console buyers are pre-selected for willingness to pay by their prior spend
  • FIFA Ultimate Team is a greater-than-one-billion-dollar-a-year card-pack business
  • Zero-to-one conversion on free-to-play is the hardest step in the funnel
  • Cross-play players in Fortnite monetised at multiples of non-cross-play players, per the Apple lawsuit

“that is a massive business like it is a you know greater than a billion dollar a year business card pack selling like literally bits…”

Mitch Lasky · 43:30

“who's already paid sixty dollars for the game and five hundred dollars for the console right the the willingness to pay of that of that…”

Mitch Lasky · 44:00
#monetisation#free to play#console#willingness to pay
Explainer1:26:30

What blockchain actually unlocks in games: not much, deliberately

Asked what web3 mechanically changes about game business models, Lasky's answer is that the good news is not much. The best designs adhere closely to conventional free-to-play models and use crypto to enhance the elder game - the phase where long-tenured players are engaged in status competition rather than the core progression loop. A veteran of fifteen years in World of Warcraft is not killing chickens for gold; they are playing a social game, and that is where tokenised status has room to add value.

  • The best web3 games stay close to conventional free-to-play mechanics
  • Crypto's role is enhancing the late-stage or elder game, not replacing the core loop
  • Long-tenured players are playing a status and social game, not the original progression game
  • The first wave of crypto game content came from outsiders building thin wrappers around NFT marketplaces

“the good news is not that much right I honestly believe this right I think the best of them adhere very closely to the conventional…”

Mitch Lasky · 1:26:30

“if you've been playing Warcraft for World of Warcraft for 15 years you're not running around killing chickens for gold”

Mitch Lasky · 1:27:00
#web3#game design#tokens#elder game
Explainer1:32:30

Roblox is already web3 - and the most highly taxed app store on earth

Lasky argues Roblox has no blockchain component and barely needs one: it runs a genuinely viable peer-to-peer economy, and may be the most successful web3 application in practice. The catch is the take rate. Because Robux is taxed every time it moves between parties, the compounding gross tax lands somewhere around fifty-five to sixty percent by his calculation, making it the most highly taxed app store in existence.

  • Roblox demonstrates a working peer-to-peer virtual economy without a blockchain
  • Developers are paid in Robux, which is taxed on extraction
  • The tax compounds with every transfer between parties
  • Estimated gross take lands near fifty-five to sixty percent

“Roblox is the most highly taxed App Store on earth”

Mitch Lasky · 1:32:30

“I think the last time I calculated the the total tax the gross tax was somewhere close to 60 percent”

Mitch Lasky · 1:33:00
#roblox#virtual economies#take rate#web3
Explainer1:41:30

The arcade business was bigger and lasted far longer than remembered

Testing the hosts' claim that gaming has always been larger than TV and Hollywood once arcade coin drop is included, Lasky is agnostic on the comparison but insists on the underlying fact: the arcade business was enormous and persisted for a very long time. That explains why Sega hesitated over the console transition - it was making billions in coin-op revenue in the 1970s and had every incentive to protect it.

  • Arcade coin drop was a far larger share of the industry, for far longer, than most timelines suggest
  • Console manufacturers openly wrestled with cannibalising their own coin-op revenue
  • Sega's reluctance to abandon arcades is offered as a reason it is not Nintendo today
  • Arcades functioned as important social spaces for a generation of players

“I think regardless the really interesting fact is how big the arcade business was”

Mitch Lasky · 1:41:30

“these console manufacturers really were wrestling with do we risk it do we risk you know our coin out business”

Host · 1:42:00
#arcades#sega#industry history#cannibalisation

Story· 6

Story08:00

How Nintendo used Black Friday sell-outs as a weapon

Lasky, then running studios at Activision, describes competing with Nintendo for finite shelf space at Best Buy. Nintendo would release only a limited amount of inventory for a new Metroid or Zelda before Black Friday, let parents find it sold out, then flood shelves a week or two before Christmas. He calls it genius, and something only Nintendo could pull off because of its luxury-goods aura.

  • Retail shelf space, not software quality, was the binding constraint in the packaged-goods era
  • Deliberate scarcity at Black Friday created panic among parents buying from Christmas lists
  • Inventory was released late, pulling shoppers back to stores twice
  • Only a brand with luxury-good perception could run the play without damaging itself

“there's there's limited shelf space in Best Buy and so for they were very much a competitor for that shelf space”

Mitch Lasky · 08:00

“they were very clever about only releasing a limited amount of inventory for Black Friday”

Mitch Lasky · 08:00
#nintendo#retail#scarcity#competition
Story24:30

Steam started as a patcher Microsoft refused to build

Gabe Newell and Mike Harrington wanted a software updater so Valve could fix bugs, rebalance and validate licences after shipping boxed games in a piracy-heavy era. They asked their former employer Microsoft to build it and were told no, so they built it themselves and put it on the Half-Life disc. Over the following decade they added community, an app store and mod support, incrementally eating the games industry.

  • The original purpose was patching and licence validation, not distribution
  • Microsoft declined to build the tool, so Valve built it in-house
  • It shipped on a physical disc and auto-installed with the game
  • A decade of incremental feature additions turned a utility into the default PC storefront

“they asked if Microsoft would be willing to build this tool for them and they said no so they built it themselves”

Mitch Lasky · 25:30

“very incrementally over the next decade they just kept adding features Community uh an app store mods all of these various features and and and…”

Mitch Lasky · 26:00
#steam#valve#distribution#platform history
Story48:00

Lasky on pushing Discord into a game store that failed

Discord's audience self-identified as gamers and its founder is as deep a gamer as you can get, so Lasky pushed hard for the company to become a platform-based publisher and start a game store. It did not work. He calls it his own failure rather than the company's, and uses it as the counterexample proving that owning a relevant audience is necessary but not sufficient.

  • The logic looked airtight: a large, self-identified gamer audience and a gamer founder
  • Discord's original audience was gamer-centric before broadening to crypto and AI communities
  • The game store did not stick despite genuine intent and capability
  • Lasky takes the failure personally rather than blaming the team

“we tried this at Discord yes right and we tried to start a game store this was obviously my my failure because I pushed them…”

Mitch Lasky · 48:00

“it seemed very logical to me that you could try and leverage that intentionally into the game's business and it didn't work so it doesn't…”

Mitch Lasky · 48:30
#discord#platform strategy#failure#venture capital
Story52:30

Riot told Lasky they wanted to be Blizzard - and he was wrong

After League of Legends became a hit, Lasky pushed the founders to leverage the audience into another title, a third-party game or licensed IP. They refused, saying they wanted to be Blizzard and make a game every five years. Riot instead tripled down on League of Legends, building a billion-dollar-plus revenue base and an esports ecosystem, then shipped Valorant and Teamfight Tactics. Lasky concedes they reached the destination he wanted, roughly seven years later than he would have.

  • The disagreement was about sequencing, not about the destination
  • Riot chose global expansion and esports over rapid portfolio expansion
  • Blizzard itself only had to self-fund for three years of its history
  • Lasky's self-assessment: he was wrong, and he is not that patient

“they were like nah chill man we want to be blizzard we want to make a game every five years”

Mitch Lasky · 52:30

“and I was wrong because they just took their time to become a platform-based publisher but uh did it I'm not that patient”

Mitch Lasky · 53:00
#riot games#portfolio strategy#patience#board dynamics
Story57:00

The pitch that never mentioned the game

Jenova Chen pitched the Benchmark partnership without describing the game at all. He argued the video game business was stunted by serving only a narrow band of human emotion - anger, violence, envy, accumulation - while music, art, poetry and film explored the rest. Lasky ducked, expecting a blast from his partners. Instead Kevin Harvey told him to chase Chen into the parking lot and give him a term sheet.

  • The pitch was entirely thesis, with no product description
  • Lasky lacked the seniority at the time to champion it openly
  • Kevin Harvey's reaction reframed it as exactly the kind of founder Benchmark funds
  • The investment predated Snap, Discord and Riot in Lasky's Benchmark run

“he basically talked the whole time he didn't talk about the game he wanted to make at all he just talked about emotions”

Mitch Lasky · 57:00

“Kevin Harvey turned to me and said chase that guy out in the parking lot and give him a term sheet”

Mitch Lasky · 57:30
#pitching#venture capital#thatgamecompany#benchmark
Story1:38:00

Evans and Sutherland: the Fairchild Semiconductor of computer graphics

Lasky's correction to the hosts' Nintendo episode is a lineage story. Two University of Utah professors formed the computer graphics practice there and spun out with a bucket of DARPA money to build the first commercial flight simulators in the late 1970s. The programme produced Ed Catmull, Alan Kay, John Warnock and Jim Clark, and the company itself moved through supercomputers into console silicon, helping develop Namco's Ridge Racer.

  • The Utah graphics programme seeded Pixar, Adobe, Apple's interface work and Silicon Graphics
  • Nolan Bushnell went through Utah roughly a decade before that cohort, as an electrical engineering student
  • DARPA funding built the first commercial high-fidelity flight simulators
  • Former employees went on to start a cluster of games companies

“this utah-based company called Evans and Sutherland”

Mitch Lasky · 1:38:00

“all of these incredible people came through the that University of Utah computer Graphics program”

Mitch Lasky · 1:39:30
#computer graphics#history#university of utah#flight simulators

Takeaway· 1

Takeaway2:00:30

Four places AI hits games first - and one thing it will not do

Lasky rejects the idea that you will describe a game and have it appear, the way mid-journey generates art; making a coherent, narratively satisfying interactive experience is not an early win for AI. What he and senior industry executives converged on instead are four near-term investment areas: art pipeline, quality assurance and balancing, live operations, and AI dungeon-mastering for narrative experiences.

  • Art pipeline is the lowest-hanging fruit given the staggering volume of assets an MMO needs
  • AI playtesting can already describe an activity as fun, a term the industry has never agreed on
  • Balancing is an arbitrage hunt, and AI can find exploits earlier than human playtesting
  • Live operations and dynamic quest generation are where Lasky is most excited
  • AI dungeon-mastering could supply narrative in the background of tabletop-style play

“you can just describe a piece of art and it and it magically appears that people will be able to describe a game and it'll…”

Mitch Lasky · 2:00:30

“we kind of agreed on that there were going to be four really interesting areas of investment early on um I think one is Art…”

Mitch Lasky · 2:01:30
#artificial intelligence#game development#liveops#investment themes