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29 August 2016

Jet

3Frameworks
11Insights

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Frameworks in this episode

Insights & moments

The myth-busts, hot takes, explainers, and tools worth keeping.

Hot Take· 2

Hot Take38:30

A Better Retailer Will Not Be the Thing That Disrupts Amazon

The hosts contend that Jet was a faster version of a familiar retailer rather than a fundamental threat to Amazon. A genuine disruption would more likely change fulfillment, manufacturing, or the purchasing interface through technologies such as drones, local 3D printing, voice, or virtual reality.

  • Jet still operated within the traditional retail model
  • Amazon was already investing in potential disruptions
  • Drones could change delivery economics
  • Voice could change how customers order
  • Local manufacturing could alter fulfillment entirely

“what'll disrupt Amazon is like drones, you know, or 3D printing or virtual reality.”

David Rosenthal · 58:30

“Jet is a faster horse.”

David Rosenthal · 58:30
#disruption#amazon#drones#3d printing#voice
Hot Take59:30

The Verdict: A Weak Deal Walmart Still Had to Make

David initially grades the acquisition a D, while Ben chooses a C because Walmart had to attempt something and Jet may have been its best available option. The deal was viewed as an expensive and unlikely answer to Amazon, but one that supplied a leader and team Walmart could not plausibly recruit on its own.

  • David graded the deal a D
  • Ben graded it a C
  • Both considered Jet likely to remain behind Amazon
  • Walmart's need to act prevented an F
  • The acquired team made the strategic gamble more credible

“D. Like it's it's not an F because Walmart had to do something.”

David Rosenthal · 59:30

“I'm gonna go see uh for the reason that I was saying a minute ago, which is like they had to do something, and this…”

Ben Gilbert · 1:00:00
#acquisition grade#walmart#jet.com#strategy

Explainer· 5

Explainer20:30

Why Investors Funded Jet Despite Its Missing Profit Engine

Jet's rapid customer and revenue growth offered investors a plausible scale story despite questionable unit economics. It reached two million active customers, generated $33 million in December revenue, and later reported $90 million in May revenue after launching less than a year earlier.

  • Fidelity led a $350 million round
  • The reported post-money valuation was $1.4 billion
  • Jet reached two million active customers
  • Monthly revenue rose from $33 million to $90 million
  • Strategic acquisition value likely supported the investment thesis

“at the end of December they announced that they now have two million active customers, uh, and that they did 33 million in revenue in…”

David Rosenthal · 21:30

“The growth is the growth is incredible.”

David Rosenthal · 24:00
#growth#venture capital#revenue#unit economics
Explainer35:30

Jet Gave Walmart Access to Customers Who Avoided Walmart

Beyond talent and technology, Jet supplied an attractive customer asset: urban and millennial shoppers. That demographic contrasted sharply with Walmart's established base and aligned better with the broader movement toward urban living and digitally native commerce.

  • Walmart explicitly highlighted Jet's customer base
  • Jet skewed toward urban and millennial consumers
  • Those customers were not naturally shopping at Walmart
  • The acquisition offered demographic diversification

“Jet has a growing customer base of urban and millennial customers.”

David Rosenthal · 35:30

“Boy, that doesn't sound like Walmart's base.”

Ben Gilbert · 36:00
#millennials#customers#retail#walmart
Explainer45:30

Why Jet Could Not Keep Financing Its Amazon Challenge

The hosts argue that Jet lacked both advantages Amazon had during its rise: public-market financing and time to build before facing an entrenched equivalent. With high cash burn, no clear profit engine, and diminished ambitions, an acquisition by Walmart, Google, Target, or another threatened incumbent was increasingly likely.

  • Amazon was not a realistic acquirer because of Lore's history
  • Jet needed more capital than private investors could sustainably provide
  • An IPO was not considered credible
  • Amazon had built slowly without competing against an existing Amazon
  • Investor pressure for a strategic exit was likely

“they were not going to be able to continue to raise the amount of money that they would need.”

David Rosenthal · 48:00

“They had to do it super fast and they had to do it from private market investors.”

Ben Gilbert · 48:00
#exit strategy#cash burn#amazon#acquisitions
Explainer51:30

Walmart's Innovator's Dilemma Made Amazon Hard to Fight

Walmart watched Amazon grow but could not easily copy its low-margin online model without cannibalizing its highly profitable existing business. Public shareholders further complicated any plan requiring a decade of weaker economics in exchange for possible long-term survival.

  • Amazon competed using structurally thinner margins
  • Walmart's profitable incumbent model constrained its response
  • Building a rival required cannibalization
  • Public-market expectations discouraged a long transition
  • Buying Jet gave Walmart a better chance than building alone

“this is such a classic innovator's dilemma.”

Ben Gilbert · 53:00

“what that would involve is is cannibalizing their incredible business and building a super low margin business.”

Ben Gilbert · 53:30
#innovators dilemma#walmart#amazon#disruption
Explainer59:00

Amazon's Real Advantage Extends Beyond Retail Margins

Amazon does not depend solely on earning a few pennies from each retail sale. Its marketplace, Fulfillment by Amazon, warehouse capacity, seller services, and AWS relationships let it capture value throughout the infrastructure surrounding each transaction.

  • Third-party sellers pay Amazon platform fees
  • Fulfillment by Amazon monetizes warehouse and logistics capacity
  • Some sellers also use AWS
  • Amazon captures value across the transaction stack
  • Jet remained closer to a conventional retail-margin model

“They've created this totally different business model that's not making a couple pennies on every transaction.”

Ben Gilbert · 59:30

“they're playing a different game.”

Ben Gilbert · 59:30
#amazon#marketplace#fulfillment#business model

Story· 3

Story04:30

The Diapers.com Battle That Foreshadowed Walmart's Jet Deal

Mark Lore's conflict with Amazon began years before Jet, when Amazon aggressively competed with and ultimately acquired his company Quidsi, operator of Diapers.com. Walmart was also interested, and Jeff Bezos reportedly instructed Amazon's corporate-development team not to let Walmart buy it.

  • Mark Lore founded Quidsi and built Diapers.com
  • Amazon used aggressive pricing and acquisition tactics
  • Walmart was already a competing bidder
  • The rivalry established the personal and strategic context for Jet

“do not under any circumstances allow Walmart to buy this company.”

David Rosenthal · 07:00

“he's kind of got a chip on his shoulder, and he wants to gun for Amazon and Bezos, kind of with a vengeance.”

David Rosenthal · 09:00
#diapers.com#amazon#walmart#mark lore
Story11:30

How Jet Raised $220 Million Before Selling a Single Item

Jet pursued scale from its inception, raising $80 million at formation and another $140 million before launch. The extraordinary pre-launch financing reflected Mark Lore's reputation and the immense capital required to challenge Amazon directly.

  • Jet began in summer 2014
  • The initial financing was $80 million
  • A second pre-launch round added $140 million
  • Jet had raised $220 million before its website went live

“before they even launched the company, launched the product, uh, he's raised two hundred and twenty million dollars.”

David Rosenthal · 12:00

“there are a small handful of people in the world that could do a seed like that”

Ben Gilbert · 11:30
#fundraising#venture capital#jet.com#e-commerce
Story14:00

Jet Abandoned Its Costco Membership Model in Three Months

Jet originally planned to earn its profit from a $50 annual membership while passing transaction margins back to shoppers. Only three months after launch, it eliminated the membership fee, leaving an unresolved path to profitability despite continuing to promise prices below Amazon's.

  • The original model copied Costco's membership economics
  • Jet planned to make almost nothing on merchandise transactions
  • Memberships were priced at $50 per year
  • The fee was eliminated three months after launch
  • Lower-than-Amazon pricing remained economically suspect

“the bottom line is we're basically not making a dime on any of the transactions, we're passing it all back to the consumer.”

David Rosenthal quoting Mark Lore · 14:30

“our only profit engine, we're killing.”

Ben Gilbert · 19:30
#business model#memberships#unit economics#jet.com

Takeaway· 1

Takeaway30:00

Walmart's $3.3 Billion Bet Was Really on Talent and Technology

The hosts classify Jet primarily as a people-and-technology acquisition rather than a durable standalone product purchase. Mark Lore would run both Jet and Walmart.com, while Walmart gained a large technical team capable of making it a more credible destination for e-commerce talent.

  • Walmart paid $3 billion in cash and $300 million in stock incentives
  • Mark Lore received a five-year retention structure
  • Lore was assigned leadership of Walmart.com
  • Jet brought a sophisticated technical organization
  • The deal could change Walmart's ability to recruit technologists

“it's a people and a technology acquisition.”

Ben Gilbert · 33:30

“this is the most interesting place to be.”

Ben Gilbert · 35:00
#acquisitions#talent#technology#walmart