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05 May 2021

Special: 2021 China Tech Trends (with Tech Buzz China)

2Frameworks
18Insights

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Frameworks in this episode

Insights & moments

The myth-busts, hot takes, explainers, and tools worth keeping.

Myth Buster· 2

Myth Buster

Domestic brands aren't winning on nationalism, they're closing a share gap

The media framing of Chinese consumers as nationalist misses the actual arithmetic. In the United States around a quarter of fast-moving consumer goods brands are foreign, while in China foreign penetration sits north of forty percent and far higher in some categories. If China converges on developed-market norms, that difference is the share domestic brands can take.

  • US foreign-brand share of FMCG is roughly one quarter
  • China's foreign-brand penetration is above forty percent
  • Convergence alone implies a large domestic opportunity
  • Improved manufacturing and design accelerate the shift

“the media narrative is all about like the youth being very nationalist, but actually it's because if you look at developed countries”

“if you look at China again, the foreign brand penetration is actually north of 40%, very, very high, much higher than that for certain other…”

#consumer-brands#market-share#fmcg#china-tech
Myth Buster

'Rural China' means million-person cities, not fields

Third tier and below still covers around a billion people, and growth there runs near ten percent GDP per capita year on year while national growth slows. A fifth-tier city typically holds about a million people, the size of San Francisco, with some tall buildings and, tellingly, a Starbucks either open or opening. Ying-Ying Lu's own fourth-tier birth city has 5.77 million residents.

  • Third tier and below is still roughly a billion people
  • Rural China grows near 10 percent GDP per capita annually
  • A fifth-tier city is about a million people
  • A new Starbucks is a reliable consumption indicator
  • Housing there is often denser than San Francisco

“The rest of China, quote unquote, rural China, third tier and below is it's still a billion people.”

“when we do say rural China, like we've already described, we're not talking rural areas, we're talking cities like the one I just gave you”

#rural-china#city-tiers#consumer-market#growth

Hot Take· 4

Hot Take

The end state isn't just-in-time manufacturing, it's just-in-time design

The point of the flexible supply chain is not speed for its own sake but eliminating risk. If you can make goods exactly as demand arrives, inventory risk goes to zero. David Rosenthal pushes it further: if design itself happens on demand, there is no product risk either. Both sides agree nobody is there yet, and Rui Ma is explicit that she is not a fan of the model's environmental profile.

  • Flexibility is about removing inventory risk, not just lead time
  • The theoretical end state is zero inventory
  • Just-in-time design would remove product risk as well
  • Nobody has actually reached it
  • Environmental cost is not priced into ultra fast fashion

“the end goal really is to have it to be so flexible that you can make it as demand comes in, right? So that it…”

“it's not even like just in time manufacturing, it's just in time creation and design of products”

#supply-chain#inventory#fast-fashion#sustainability
Hot Take

Lower-tier city residents can have more to spend than Shanghai earners

Headline income levels mislead because housing swallows the difference. Income disparity between tiers might be two or three times, but real estate prices can differ by ten times, so a tier-four resident may end up with more discretionary spending than someone in Shanghai. Ying-Ying Lu's aunt spends hundreds of dollars on clothing on a salary of one to two thousand a month.

  • Income gap between tiers is roughly two to three times
  • Property price gap can be ten times
  • Discretionary spend can therefore invert
  • Government jobs often bundle housing and benefits
  • The same logic applies to US coastal cities

“the income disparity might be a factor of like two, three times, but the real estate prices might be a factor of 10 times”

#consumer-spending#city-tiers#real-estate#china-tech
Hot Take

Investors now buy Baidu for autonomy and get search for free

The Western read is that Baidu fell off the map behind Alibaba and Tencent. Investors Rui Ma speaks to see it differently: they are buying an autonomous driving company and getting the search business thrown in, which David Rosenthal compares to investing in Waymo and getting Google for free. Baidu now introduces itself as an AI company.

  • Baidu's investment case has shifted to autonomous driving
  • The search business is treated as a free option
  • Direct analogue: buying Waymo and getting Google free
  • Baidu now self-describes as an AI company

“oh you're basically investing in Baidu as an autonomous driving company and you're getting the search business for free”

#baidu#autonomous-driving#investing#china-tech
Hot Take

China can rebuild the road, so level five is anyone's game

Baidu is working with government on autonomy that changes the road infrastructure itself, not just the software. The US cannot realistically match that, both because of sunk reliance on the existing system and because of federalism, with fifty states legislating independently. Rui Ma calls this the first genuinely deep-tech competition between the two countries, rather than a lightweight consumer app race.

  • Chinese autonomy programmes include remaking road infrastructure
  • The US faces both legacy lock-in and a federal patchwork
  • This is framed as the first deep-tech head-to-head
  • Talent is drawn from Baidu and Google alumni
  • The first country to level five captures large efficiency gains

“Baidu, for example, is working with the government on autonomous driving solutions that aren't just the software, but also include remaking the infrastructure on the…”

“the word on the ground is that it's anyone's game. Like who's gonna get to level five first? It's not clear that it would be…”

#autonomous-driving#infrastructure#policy#deep-tech

Explainer· 9

Explainer

The China podcast that scripts every episode and records apart

Tech Buzz China does not record as a conversation at all. Each host writes the episode out beforehand and records their part separately, then the parts are cut together so it sounds like two people reacting to each other in real time. The result sits closer to an audiobook than to an interview show.

  • Episodes are fully written before recording
  • Hosts record their parts separately and never in the same room
  • The finished cut simulates a live back-and-forth
  • Research load is comparable to Acquired's

“We just record separately. I record my part and then Ying records her part. It's more like an audiobook each episode”

#podcasting#production#research#media
Explainer

OEM to ODM to OBM: how Chinese factories moved up the stack

The old model was that you arrived in China with a finished spec, brand and design and only needed someone to build it. Factories then took on design (ODM), and now market themselves as original brand manufacturers doing nearly everything including marketing copy. Rui Ma cautions that the OBM label is still largely PR, but the underlying capability has genuinely improved.

  • OEM: you bring the spec, they build it
  • ODM: you bring a fuzzy brief, they design and build it
  • OBM: they do nearly everything except the final branding
  • The OBM label is partly marketing over what remain ODMs

“To today, I hear people call it, you know, call these factories OBMs, right? Original brand manufacturings, where literally they're doing pretty much everything for…”

“I should caveat with saying that is still, in my opinion, a lot of PR.”

#manufacturing#supply-chain#consumer-brands#china-tech
Explainer

Shein's five days from design to shipment, a thousand designs a day

Shein compressed apparel's design-to-ship cycle to about five days and pushes roughly a thousand new designs a day, entirely online and entirely outside China. Demand runs through social media, with around nineteen million Instagram followers at the time of recording. For contrast, the show notes that Zara-era fast fashion was praised for five weeks.

  • Around five days from design to shipment on average
  • Roughly a thousand new designs a day
  • About ten billion dollars in revenue, sold outside China
  • Fast fashion's old benchmark was five weeks, not five days
  • Nineteen million Instagram followers, not a Chinese platform

“So Shein takes five days of designing to ship. This is on average.”

“the knock was, oh, they're, you know, busting their ass to get this to customers' hands, you know, five weeks after they come up with…”

#shein#fast-fashion#supply-chain#dtc#e-commerce
Explainer

Why saturated margins push Chinese DTC brands to sell abroad

Domestic Chinese DTC brands work to a gross margin benchmark of thirty to forty percent, but in some industries brands charge closer to ten percent over cost. When a player like Xiaomi enters, prices get pushed toward five percent and weaker competitors die. Selling overseas without a native advantage can be less brutal than fighting a saturated home category.

  • Domestic DTC gross margin benchmark is 30 to 40 percent
  • Some categories run at roughly 10 percent over cost
  • Xiaomi-style entry compresses margins toward 5 percent
  • Overseas expansion is chosen as the less vicious fight

“within China, DTC brands insist on having a gross profit margin of 30 to 40%”

“when someone like Xiaomi enters the same market, then they'll kind of push all of the prices down to something like 5%, and all of…”

#margins#competition#dtc#cross-border#china-tech
Explainer

China leads in digital retail, not only in e-commerce

The under-covered story is offline retail that is highly digitised. US stores turned into e-commerce pickup points during the pandemic; Chinese stores have been designed that way for a decade, changing layout, warehouse placement and customer flow. Store apps are integrated rather than siloed, unlike the Costco versus Costco.com split, and consumers simply think of it as shopping.

  • Digital retail means a highly digitised offline experience
  • Chinese stores were built as pickup points from the start
  • Store layout and warehousing are designed around it
  • App and store are integrated, not separate businesses
  • Consumers do not distinguish online from offline shopping

“yes, China leads in e-commerce, but China actually also leads in digital retail”

“in China, actually, that's something that's been happening for the last 10 years, where shops are designed that way from the get-go because e-commerce has…”

#retail#omnichannel#e-commerce#china-tech
Explainer

The 'operations' team that has no Silicon Valley equivalent

Every Chinese e-commerce platform runs a large operations org constantly working promotions and merchant relationships so the storefront changes between sessions. There is no clean analogue at US internet companies, but Ben Gilbert identifies one: live ops teams inside US gaming companies. Rui Ma notes that gaming was the only reliably working Chinese business model a decade ago, which is likely where the habit came from.

  • Operations teams constantly rework promotions and merchant deals
  • Users expect new content every time they open the app
  • Closest US analogue is live ops in gaming, not e-commerce
  • Gaming was once the default monetisation path in China

“in China, like there's a huge team called operations uh that's really hard to find an analog in the you know in Silicon Valley companies”

“It's actually very common in gaming companies in the US to have a live operations team.”

#operations#e-commerce#live-ops#gaming#personalization
Explainer

Why advertising never became China's default business model

Selling advertising in China was hard for years, and the reason is structural rather than cultural. With GDP per capita around ten thousand dollars against over sixty-five thousand in the US, capital was better spent building distribution than buying attention. Advertising is the business model of a saturated economy where distribution is already built and competitors fight over the same shelf.

  • Advertising was genuinely difficult to sell in early China tech
  • Growing distribution beat advertising on return
  • Advertising suits saturated economies with built-out distribution
  • Gaming and commerce were the direct value-capture routes instead
  • ByteDance and Alibaba are the notable advertising exceptions

“you should just invest your profits into growing distribution that you got way more bang for your buck out of just organically growing, you know,…”

“advertising, if you think about it, it's really for a kind of saturated economy where all the distributions are already built out”

#advertising#business-models#distribution#china-tech
Explainer

Every Chinese internet company suddenly wants to build an EV

Within a single month Huawei announced software for EVs, Xiaomi committed ten billion dollars over ten years, and even drone maker DJI joined in. Tencent backed NIO, Alibaba backed XPeng and Meituan backed Li Auto, all three now listed and all sharply up. Rui Ma frames the driver as national security as much as climate: dependence on oil is destabilising.

  • Huawei, Xiaomi and DJI all announced EV moves within a month
  • Xiaomi committed ten billion dollars over ten years
  • Tencent, Alibaba and Meituan each backed a listed EV maker
  • NIO was near-death in late 2019, later valued around 59 billion dollars
  • Climate policy is framed partly as national security

“Xiaomi announce that they're going to invest 10 billion dollars over the next 10 years into EVs.”

“EVs are the new games for Chinese companies.”

#electric-vehicles#china-tech#investing#climate
Explainer

China's antitrust crackdown was years in the making, not a surprise

China's first antitrust law arrived in 2008, more than a century after the US, and effectively nothing happened in internet for the following decade beyond the Qihoo 360 versus Tencent case. Drafts issued from January 2020 target platform companies, aimed at exclusivity demands and discriminatory pricing. Alibaba's 2.8 billion dollar fine follows practices where penalties had been capped near a token amount.

  • China's first antitrust law passed in 2008 versus the 1890s in the US
  • Roughly a decade with no internet antitrust cases heard
  • The Qihoo 360 versus Tencent fight reshaped Tencent's strategy toward investing
  • Alibaba fined 2.8 billion dollars for exclusivity abuse
  • Platforms were charging loyal customers more than new ones
  • Founders and VCs on the ground welcome the rules

“Chinese antitrust law, the first version was passed in 2008, which is really late, right?”

“They're like, we know you're really sticky and you're very loyal. So we're gonna actually charge you more for the same thing than for a…”

#antitrust#regulation#china-tech#platforms

Story· 1

Story

When China went from twelve angel investors to thousands of funds

Before roughly 2013 to 2014, China tech was tiny: there was a book called Angel Investors of China listing around twelve people, and joining an accelerator looked bizarre. Within two years the country had thousands of accelerators and hundreds of early-stage funds. The deeper change was social, with startups moving from something only failures did to the obvious path for the ambitious.

  • A single book once listed roughly twelve Chinese angel investors
  • Around 2014 capital and accelerators arrived at scale
  • Attitudes flipped: startups went from last resort to first choice
  • Pinduoduo, ByteDance and Meituan all date from this window

“there literally was a book called Angel Investors of China. I think it had like 12 men in it.”

“people went from thinking that was something honestly only losers did if they couldn't get a real job, to now, oh, all the best and…”

#venture-capital#china-tech#startup-ecosystem#history

Takeaway· 2

Takeaway

Chinese founders don't believe in staying in their lane

The meta point of the episode: do not expect Chinese companies to impose category boundaries on themselves. ByteDance moves into local services against Meituan, Xiaomi into EVs, and ByteDance has also invested in fintech and a hospital. With GDP up thirtyfold in thirty years, both consumers and founders are hyper-adaptive and nobody takes a position for granted.

  • US firms define a core competency; Chinese firms define capital and users
  • ByteDance moved into local services, fintech and even a hospital
  • Meituan began as a Groupon clone and became travel plus group buying
  • Thirtyfold GDP growth in thirty years breeds existential adaptability

“for Chinese companies, don't expect them to impose any boundaries on themselves”

“Chinese entrepreneurs think we have lots of competencies. We have a lot of capital, we have a lot of users.”

#strategy#diversification#china-tech#founders
Takeaway

The next wave is Chinese companies going to Brazil, India and Southeast Asia

Ying-Ying Lu's forward view is renewed internationalisation after a COVID pause, and not only toward the US and Europe. Southeast Asia, Brazil, India and other emerging markets are the target, with e-commerce especially well positioned. Founders with global education or domestic success return home to build, then take on the rest of the world from a well-funded base.

  • Internationalisation restarted and is accelerating after COVID
  • Emerging markets, not just the US and Europe, are the target
  • E-commerce is the best-positioned sector for it
  • Returnee founders build at home first, then expand outward
  • Capital is recognising the cycle

“there's a lot of increased internationalization that we kind of thought stopped last year because of COVID, but I actually see signs of it starting…”

#internationalization#emerging-markets#e-commerce#china-tech