AAcquired
← All episodes
Dan Levitan03 April 2017

The Starbucks IPO with Dan Levitan

3Frameworks
14Insights

Listen

Frameworks in this episode

Insights & moments

The myth-busts, hot takes, explainers, and tools worth keeping.

Myth Buster· 1

Myth Buster1:07:00

Great Companies Never Permanently Arrive at Success

The hosts initially describe Starbucks' post-IPO path as lacking an obvious crisis, but Levitan rejects the idea that enduring companies follow straight lines. Even iconic businesses face dark periods, and Schultz viewed success as something the organization had to earn every day.

  • Iconic companies experience serious setbacks
  • Present scale obscures earlier dark periods
  • Success is a continuing process rather than a permanent state
  • Complacency becomes dangerous when outsiders believe a company has made it

“there's plenty of dark days in every business.”

Dan Levitan · 1:07:00

“I have to earn it every day. We have to earn it every day.”

Dan Levitan · 1:07:30
#resilience#company building#starbucks#leadership

Hot Take· 1

Hot Take57:30

Voice Commerce Is the Next On-Ramp to Impulse Buying

Levitan argues that mobile shortened the path to purchasing but still requires deliberate physical interaction. Voice can reduce that distance further, allowing purchases to fit naturally into moments such as ordering coffee from a connected car while commuting.

  • Traditional e-commerce required deliberate navigation
  • Mobile moved purchasing closer to the moment of impulse
  • Voice can remove additional physical and interface friction
  • Connected cars create natural ordering contexts
  • Commerce interfaces still need to reinforce the brand experience

“But mobile is only one step toward impulse.”

Dan Levitan · 58:00

“I think voice is the next frontier.”

Dan Levitan · 58:30
#voice commerce#ecommerce#impulse buying#connected cars

Explainer· 4

Explainer23:30

Inside Starbucks' Meticulous Investment-Bank Beauty Contest

Starbucks invited six banks to compete for two or possibly three underwriting positions. The company assessed formal criteria such as chemistry, specialization, track record, and trading history, while quietly observing whether bankers cared about the roasting operation and whether senior people would travel to Seattle.

  • Six banks pitched across a two-day period
  • Candidates answered a seven- or eight-page checklist in advance
  • A roasting-plant tour functioned as an unannounced culture test
  • Arriving in a limousine counted against Levitan's team
  • Goldman Sachs was penalized when senior bankers would not come to Seattle

“There was a bunch of different vectors off of which they would make their choice.”

Dan Levitan · 24:30

“We didn't know it, but we were being judged as to who was really interested in the roasting facility versus who was really just there…”

Dan Levitan · 25:00
#ipo#investment banking#underwriters#selection
Explainer40:00

Why IPO Pricing Must Leave Some—but Not Too Much—Upside

Levitan explains that IPO pricing must balance the issuer, long-term investors, and short-term flippers. A higher price raises more money for the company and reduces speculative gains, but a broken issue can create a damaging narrative while an excessive first-day surge suggests the issuer left too much money on the table.

  • Issuers benefit from a higher offering price
  • Flippers profit more from underpricing
  • Underwriters generally seek a positive but controlled first-day move
  • A price decline can brand the offering as damaged goods
  • An overwhelming pop implies excessive value transfer to buyers

“The pricing of an IPO is a very complicated thing because you have multiple constituencies.”

Dan Levitan · 40:00

“Yet if it breaks the IPO price, then it becomes a negative story.”

Dan Levitan · 40:30
#ipo pricing#investors#capital markets#underwriting
Explainer52:00

Why 1992 Starbucks Could Not Raise Today's Private-Market Capital

Starbucks needed rapid expansion capital but operated before modern late-stage private markets existed. Its $20 million private raise in December 1991 was considered large, and the depth of capital now available to multibillion-dollar private companies simply had no meaningful equivalent.

  • Slower expansion risked surrendering market leadership
  • Starbucks needed capital to enter and own markets quickly
  • Late-stage private and hedge-fund capital was scarce
  • A $20 million private round was large in 1991
  • An IPO was one of the few practical routes to substantial growth capital

“They probably wouldn't have the domination that they have.”

Dan Levitan · 52:30

“They didn't have access to the capital that private companies have today. Period, full stop.”

Dan Levitan · 54:30
#private markets#ipo#venture capital#retail expansion
Explainer55:00

The Three Waves of Coffee as a Model for Internet Markets

The hosts compare mass-market canned coffee, Starbucks' social café experience, and artisanal third-wave coffee with successive internet eras. The analogy moves from a poor one-size-fits-all product, to a compelling social platform, to fragmented and highly personalized experiences.

  • First-wave coffee was standardized home consumption
  • Starbucks turned coffee into a social experience
  • Third-wave coffee fragmented into local and artisanal choices
  • AOL parallels the first internet wave
  • Facebook parallels the social second wave
  • Modern apps create increasingly targeted and personalized experiences

“And then the third wave being not one size fits all, truly this broken up small group, small batch, highly targeted, highly personalized experiences.”

Ben Gilbert · 57:30
#coffee#internet#facebook#personalization

Story· 5

Story05:30

How Il Giornale Became the Starbucks Coffee Company

Howard Schultz discovered Milan's coffee-bar culture while working for the original bean-roasting Starbucks. After the founders declined his café vision, he built Il Giornale, later bought Starbucks' Seattle locations for $3.8 million, and combined the businesses under the Starbucks name.

  • The original Starbucks roasted and sold beans rather than operating cafés
  • Milan showed Schultz that coffee shops could serve as social meeting places
  • Schultz founded Il Giornale after leaving Starbucks
  • He acquired the Starbucks locations and brand in 1987

“They're not just places to buy beans or buy coffee to take away. It's actually a place where you sit and you talk to people.”

David Rosenthal · 08:00

“Schultz buys these Seattle retail outlets, merges them with Ilgiornale, and re-christens the company the Starbucks Coffee Company.”

David Rosenthal · 09:30
#starbucks#howard schultz#coffee#founding story
Story10:00

Howard Schultz Heard No Hundreds of Times Before Buying Starbucks

Schultz lacked the personal wealth to purchase Starbucks and repeatedly approached potential backers. Dan Levitan says Schultz first faced roughly 250 prospects while funding Il Giornale, then assembled the Seattle angel backing needed for the Starbucks acquisition despite an alternative group favoring a more experienced operator.

  • Schultz came from a poor family in Canarsie, Brooklyn
  • He approached roughly 250 people before securing initial backing
  • Seattle angels largely favored traditional businesses at the time
  • A competing group wanted to install an experienced operator
  • Schultz ultimately aligned investors and completed the purchase

“And he went to, I think the number was about 250 people before they said yes.”

Dan Levitan · 10:30

“But as has happened many times in the last 45 years, Howard prevailed and was able to line everybody up and buy the company.”

Dan Levitan · 11:30
#fundraising#entrepreneurship#starbucks#resilience
Story17:00

Two Seattle Recommendations Convinced Dan Levitan to Visit Starbucks

Levitan initially struggled to understand how coffee could be a growth industry because canned coffee was declining. A taxi driver and hotel employee independently recommended Starbucks, after which Levitan watched customers line up at a kiosk and heard Schultz deliver an intensely passionate presentation.

  • Coffee initially looked like a declining category
  • There was no internet for remotely researching the company
  • Independent local recommendations signaled unusual loyalty
  • A store visit revealed customer demand firsthand
  • Schultz emphasized people and customers as well as the business model

“There was no internet then. You had to literally come to Seattle.”

Ben Gilbert · 18:30

“And so I sat there for about 45 minutes and people were lining up for this coffee.”

Dan Levitan · 20:00
#dan levitan#customer research#starbucks#investment banking
Story34:00

Howard Schultz Converted 59 of 60 IPO Roadshow Meetings

Before Starbucks' two-week IPO roadshow, Schultz predicted that every one of 60 large-investor meetings would produce an order. He converted 59; the sole holdout's firm became Starbucks' largest shareholder within nine months after the offering.

  • The roadshow included 60 one-on-one investor meetings
  • Schultz set a target of 100% conversion
  • Levitan warned that allocation constraints could prevent some orders
  • The final result was 59 orders from 60 meetings
  • The initial holdout later became the largest shareholder

“And he said, I'm gonna get 60.”

Dan Levitan · 35:00

“Within nine months after the IPO, who was the largest shareholder of Starbucks?”

Dan Levitan · 36:00
#ipo roadshow#sales#howard schultz#investors
Story37:00

Why Howard Schultz Forced Starbucks' IPO Price to $17

Although the offering was eight to ten times oversubscribed, capital-markets bankers recommended pricing at the top of the filed range, $16. Schultz insisted on $17 and prevailed despite resistance from both underwriting firms. The stock subsequently traded around $20 to $21 on its first day.

  • The filed range was $14 to $16 per share
  • Comparable companies had fallen roughly 30% during the process
  • Underwriters repeatedly recommended $16
  • Schultz insisted on pricing at $17
  • The stock still delivered a measured first-day increase

“And the capital markets guys recommended that we price the deal at $16 a share.”

Dan Levitan · 38:00

“Howard relentlessly prevailed, and we priced the deal at 17.”

Dan Levitan · 39:00
#ipo pricing#starbucks#capital markets#howard schultz

Takeaway· 3

Takeaway28:30

Starbucks Used Its IPO as a Customer-Acquisition Event

Going public gave the still-small Starbucks brand a national platform at a time when information about emerging companies was difficult to obtain. Levitan says comparable-store growth increased after the IPO because public visibility generated curiosity among potential customers.

  • Starbucks had roughly 80 stores near the IPO
  • Company and prospectus information was difficult to access before the web
  • The IPO supplied visibility as well as capital and liquidity
  • Public curiosity translated into higher store traffic

“And part of the reason why the company went public, frankly, was the visibility of going to a bigger platform.”

Dan Levitan · 29:30

“the comp store growth significantly increased because they realized a successful IPO would equate to curiosity amongst customers.”

Dan Levitan · 29:30
#ipo#brand awareness#retail growth#starbucks
Takeaway1:00:30

Starbucks Beat Copycats by Growing Faster and Executing Better

The successful IPO quickly attracted coffee-chain rollups and other copycats. Levitan argues that these rivals optimized for becoming IPO-ready rather than serving customers, while Starbucks' impatience helped it establish market positions before competitors could become dominant.

  • Successful offerings attract competitors to the sector
  • Several coffee chains attempted rollups after Starbucks went public
  • Copycats focused on financial packaging rather than execution
  • Starbucks entered markets quickly
  • Strong incumbency made it harder for regional competitors to emerge

“They were focused on creating something that was IPOable, but not exceeding customers' expectations every day.”

Dan Levitan · 1:01:00

“part of the reason Starbucks is where it is today is that Howard was impatient and always wanted to grow.”

Dan Levitan · 1:01:30
#competition#market expansion#starbucks#execution
Takeaway41:00

Do Not Let Daily Stock Prices Define the Company

Levitan cautions CEOs against judging employees or the business by short-term share-price movements. Company quality and market prices should correlate over long periods, but they can diverge sharply in the short term, making daily price reactions a poor operating compass.

  • Daily stock movements are noisy
  • Short-term market judgment can diverge from business quality
  • Leaders should focus employees on building the company
  • Long-term operating results matter more than transient price signals

“don't let yourself or your people be judged by whether or not the stock today goes up or down.”

Dan Levitan · 41:00

“And in the long term, they will correlate, but in the short term, they can frequently widely diverge.”

Dan Levitan · 41:00
#public companies#leadership#stock price#long term